Part III
Thursday, October 30th, 2008 by Tobias Deutsch
Response to the ENF 2007
Abstract
List of Articles
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A Computational Model of Affects
Mika TurkiaAbstract
Emotions and feelings (i.e. affects) are a central feature of human behaviour. Due to complexity and interdisciplinarity of affective phenomena, attempts to define them have often been unsatisfactory. This article provides a simple logical structure, in which affective concepts can be defined. The set of affects defined is similar to the set of emotions covered in the Ortony-Collins-Clore model, but the model presented in this article is fully computationally defined, whereas the OCC model depends on undefined concepts.
Affects are seen as unconscious, emotions as preconscious and feelings as conscious. Affects are thus a superclass of emotions and feelings with regards to consciousness. A set of affective states and related affect-specific behaviours and strategies can be defined with unconscious affects only.
In addition, affects are defined as processes of change in the body state, that have specific triggers. For example, an affect of hope is defined as a specific body state that is triggered when the agent is becomes informed about a future event, that is positive with regards to the agent’s needs.
Affects are differentiated from each other by types of causing events. Affects caused by unexpected positive, neutral and negative events are delight, surprise and fright, respectively. Affects caused by expected positive and negative future events are hope and fear.
Affects caused by expected past events are as follows: satisfaction results from a positive expectation being fulfilled, disappointment results from a positive expectation not being fulfilled, fears confirmed results from a negative expectation being fulfilled, and relief results from a negative expectation not being fulfilled. Pride is targeted towards a self-originated positive event, and shame towards a self-originated negative event. Remorse is targeted towards a self-originated action causing a negative event. Pity is targeted towards a liked agent experiencing a negative event, and happy-for towards a liked agent experiencing a positive event. Resentment is targeted towards a disliked agent experiencing a positive event, and gloating towards a disliked agent experiencing a negative event. An agent is liked/loved if it has produced a net utility greater than zero, and disliked/hated if the net utility is lower than zero. An agent is desired if it is expected to produce a positive net utility in the future, and disliked if the expected net utility is negative.
The above model for unconscious affects is easily computationally implementable, and may be used as a starting point in building believable simulation models of human behaviour. The models can be used as a starting point in the development of computational psychological, psychiatric, sociological and criminological theories, or in e.g. computer games.
Mika Turkia. A computational model of affects. In Dietmar Dietrich, Georg Fodor, Gerhard Zucker, and Dietmar Bruckner, editors, Simulating the Mind – A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, pages 277 – 290. Springer, Wien, 1 edition, 2009.@incollection{Tur09, title = “A Computational Model of Affects”, author = “Mika Turkia”, pages = “277 — 290″, booktitle = “Simulating the {M}ind – {A} {T}echnical {N}europsychoanalytical {A}pproach”, editor = “Dietmar Dietrich and Georg Fodor and Gerhard Zucker and Dietmar Bruckner”, publisher = “Springer, Wien”, year = “2009″, edition = 1}
The Physics of Thoughts
Ron SpielmanAbstract
From a “reverse engineering” perspective, it can be argued that memories – and consequently thoughts – are stored in a hypothesised system of electromagnetic wave forms “generated” by neural networks. It is argued that the empirically experienced speed of memory encoding, storage and subsequent retrieval, as encountered in the psychoanalytical consulting room, as well as in general life, is too complex and rapid to be served by known electro-physiological or biochemical brain mechanisms. There are adequate analogous examples of complex data being stored and transmitted in electro-magnetic wave forms to confer plausibility on the hypothesised memory system proposed. These wave forms would be readily “accessible” in the brain and would be able to subserve all the empirically and clinically experienced functions described in the paper.
In the field of Philosophy of Mind, debates have been between “dualists” and “monists”. The monists have prevailed. A sub-set of monists favour an “emergent” position: the mind is an emergent epi-phenomenon of brain function.
This paper will adopt this “emergent phenomenon” position. However, this still begs many questions. It will be the intent of this paper to explore some of these questions, especially from the point of view of “reverse engineering”. That is, the paper will outline some empirically established “facts” about some mental processes – especially those involving memory function – and ask what neurophysiological mechanisms would be required to support the existence of these empirically observed phenomena. These are the “demand characteristics” of the system in question.
Further, some of the empirically observed phenomena addressed will be some of those encountered clinically in the practice of psychoanalysis and psychiatry. Any attempt to emulate the mind must begin with the “best possible” understanding of how the human mind does indeed function! Broadly speaking – in relation to memory – the main question will be “where does this aspect of the mind reside?” – and what kind of known neuro-physiological and physico-chemical processes could support this aspect of mental function.
Sigmund Freud, in his Project for a Scientific Psychology [1], hoped that psychic processes would ultimately be shown to be resultant upon biological processes – but at the time of his writing, that “project” was beyond known science.
Ron Spielman. The physics of thoughts. In Dietmar Dietrich, Georg Fodor, Gerhard Zucker, and Dietmar Bruckner, editors, Simulating the Mind – A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, pages 290 – 302. Springer, Wien, 1 edition, 2009.@incollection{Spi09, title = “The Physics of Thoughts”, author = “Ron Spielman”, pages = “290 — 302″, booktitle = “Simulating the {M}ind – {A} {T}echnical {N}europsychoanalytical {A}pproach”, editor = “Dietmar Dietrich and Georg Fodor and Gerhard Zucker and Dietmar Bruckner”, publisher = “Springer, Wien”, year = “2009″, edition = 1}
A Functional View on “Cognitive” Perceptual Systems Based on Functions and Principles of the Human Mind
Matthias J. Schlemmer and Markus VinczeAbstract
We outline functionalities of an artificial system that seem to be important for cognitive behaviour. We argue from the perspective of perception as perceptual capabilities are crucial for viable performance and situated behaviour. The first part of this paper is concerned with general anthropomorphic considerations and notional questions related to terms like “conscious”, “intelligent” and “cognitive”. Then, starting from the three basic properties and five broad functional principles that Mark Solms defines in his paper and described in his talk at ENF, we set out to link the requirements for a cognitive artificial system to those cardinal aspects of the mind. Although there are some robotic capabilities still missing in order to achieve an implementation of some functions of the human mind, the results indicate interesting synergies and cross-links between (neuro-) psychoanalysis and engineering.Matthias J. Schlemmer and Markus Vincze. A functional view on ’cognitive’ perceptual systems based on functions and principles of the human mind. In Dietmar Dietrich, Georg Fodor, Gerhard Zucker, and Dietmar Bruckner, editors, Simulating the Mind – A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, pages 302 – 320. Springer, Wien, 1 edition, 2009.@incollection{SV09, title = “A Functional View on ‘Cognitive’ Perceptual Systems Based on Functions and Principles of the Human Mind”, author = “Matthias J. Schlemmer and Markus Vincze”, pages = “302 — 320″, booktitle = “Simulating the {M}ind – {A} {T}echnical {N}europsychoanalytical {A}pproach”, editor = “Dietmar Dietrich and Georg Fodor and Gerhard Zucker and Dietmar Bruckner”, publisher = “Springer, Wien”, year = “2009″, edition = 1}
Four Laws of Machine Psychodynamics
Andrzej BullerAbstract
Machine psychodynamics represent a paradigm of building brains for robots inspired by Freudian view of mind. A psychodynamic robot’s self-development is reinforced by pleasure understood as a measurable quantity that rises when a bodily or psychic tension plummets. It is also proposed that some ambivalence may accelerate a robot’s cognitive growth. Mechanisms for pleasure generation and ambivalence jointly make a robot an adventurous creature. The essence of machine psychodynamics is a set of four related laws.Andrzej Buller. Four laws of machine psychodynamics. In Dietmar Dietrich, Georg Fodor, Gerhard Zucker, and Dietmar Bruckner, editors, Simulating the Mind – A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, pages 320 – 332. Springer, Wien, 1 edition, 2009.@incollection{Bul09, title = “Four Laws of Machine Psychodynamics”, author = “Andrzej Buller”, pages = “320 — 332″, booktitle = “Simulating the {M}ind – {A} {T}echnical {N}europsychoanalytical {A}pproach”, editor = “Dietmar Dietrich and Georg Fodor and Gerhard Zucker and Dietmar Bruckner”, publisher = “Springer, Wien”, year = “2009″, edition = 1}
Artificial Group Mind, a Psychoanalytically Founded Thought Experiment
Charlotte Rösener, Tobias Deutsch, Roland Lang, Brit Müller, and Takahiro YakohAbstract
Intelligent behavior appears to be an overstressed term used in both science and psychoanalysis. Besides controversial definitions of “intelligence”, another important issue is to determine whether the mental capabilities of a crowd originates in the mental abilities of the individual or emerges from shared abilities. Psychoanalysis, starting with Freud himself, gives a clear answer to the question regarding human crowds. However the theories have to be enhanced in the case of artificial counterparts. In technology, the capabilities of control systems may vary. In the case of embedded control, models for robotic control are still very limited. The idea to tap the potential of control systems by multiplication in forming decentralized cooperating clusters should resolve current design problems. Smart group behavior should give a solution to the desire for intelligent control, but bears the risk of being unfeasible, reducing the benefit of team work instead of improving. This approach should assist in presenting crucial methods and functions inherent in the single system, as well as for the group, in order to form effective teams guided by psychoanalytical concepts. This paper concentrates on the abilities of groups and its members. It provides a summary of key feature of the Artificial Recognition system (ARS).Charlotte Roesener, Tobias Deutsch, Roland Lang, Brit Mueller,and Takahiro Yakoh. Artificial group mind, a psychoanalytically founded thought experiment. In Dietmar Dietrich, Georg Fodor, Gerhard Zucker, and Dietmar Bruckner, editors, Simulating the Mind – A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, pages 332 – 347. Springer, Wien, 1 edition, 2009.@incollection{RDL+09, title = “Artificial Group Mind, a Psychoanalytically Founded Thought Experiment”, author = “Charlotte Roesener and Tobias Deutsch and Roland Lang and Brit Mueller and Takahiro Yakoh”, pages = “332 — 347″, booktitle = “Simulating the {M}ind – {A} {T}echnical {N}europsychoanalytical {A}pproach”, editor = “Dietmar Dietrich and Georg Fodor and Gerhard Zucker and Dietmar Bruckner”, publisher = “Springer, Wien”, year = “2009″, edition = 1}
Artificial Group Psychodynamics: Emergence of the Collective
Joseph DoddsAbstract
Research into computer simulation of group and cultural processes has expanded in recent years [1], including an important recent attempt to incorporate neuropsychoanalytic principles [4]. This paper argues that in order to progress we need to start “taking the group seriously” [13] and utilize psychoanalytic theories of group-level processes. Furthermore, those currently using such psychoanalytic perspectives in a variety of contexts have a lot to gain from computer modelling. This paper aims to elucidate the key elements of three foundational psychoanalytic theories of group dynamics, those of Freud [5], Bion [7] and Jaques [11], with the goal of facilitating future computer-based implementation, and ultimately the formation of a new research field of artificial group psychodynamics.Joseph Dodds. Artificial group psychodynamics: Emergence of the collective. In Dietmar Dietrich, Georg Fodor, Gerhard Zucker, and Dietmar Bruckner, editors, Simulating the Mind – A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, pages 347 – 367. Springer, Wien, 1 edition, 2009.@incollection{Dod09, title = “Artificial Group Psychodynamics: Emergence of the Collective”, author = “Joseph Dodds”, pages = “347 — 367″, booktitle = “Simulating the {M}ind – {A} {T}echnical {N}europsychoanalytical {A}pproach”, editor = “Dietmar Dietrich and Georg Fodor and Gerhard Zucker and Dietmar Bruckner”, publisher = “Springer, Wien”, year = “2009″, edition = 1}
A Primer of Psychoanalysis for Alan Turing
Robert M. Galatzer-LevyAbstract
Contemplating how a psychoanalyst consult might aid an engineer in emulating the mind suggests several possible contributions. One has to do with what evidence would satisfy an analyst that the mind had been successfully emulated, a psychoanalytic version of Turing’s test. A second would have to do with what general elements of psychological function are most important to analysts and would therefore have to be adequately emulated. A third would be a detailed critique of particular emulations. In this paper I will explore the first two issues because they permit additional conceptual formulations and point to areas that may be surprising to engineers.Robert M. Galatzer-Levy. A primer of psychoanalysis for alan turing. In Dietmar Dietrich, Georg Fodor, Gerhard Zucker, and Dietmar Bruckner, editors, Simulating the Mind – A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, pages 367 – 381. Springer, Wien, 1 edition, 2009.@incollection{GL09, title = “A Primer of Psychoanalysis for Alan Turing”, author = “Robert M. Galatzer-Levy”, pages = “367 — 381″, booktitle = “Simulating the {M}ind – {A} {T}echnical {N}europsychoanalytical {A}pproach”, editor = “Dietmar Dietrich and Georg Fodor and Gerhard Zucker and Dietmar Bruckner”, publisher = “Springer, Wien”, year = “2009″, edition = 1}
Alexander R. Luria and the Theory of Functional Systems
Wolfgang JantzenAbstract
Luria’s neuropsychological theory of functional systems of the brain cannot be traced back to psychoanalysis. Luria’s thinking is both influenced by Vygotsky’s cultural historical psychology (and by Leontyev’s activity theory) and also by Russian physiology (Uchtomsky, Bernstein, Anokhin).
Functional systems are dynamic, self-organizing and autoregulatory centralperipheral organizations of cells, organs and organisms, the activity of which is aimed at achieving adaptive results useful for the system and the organism as a whole. Every functional system is subject of the action of a special type of “pacemaker”. Correspondingly, Luria’s theory models the brain as a space-time regulatory system and the language as a space-time process of activity, based on “sense cores”. In Leontyev’s theory “sense” represents the emotional, integrating cover of our activity space at any given moment. In ontogenesis sense coincides originally with the emotions.
In our opinion emotions represent Eigen-values or Eigen-behaviour in the organization of the psychic processes. They realize the closure of functional systems. Emotions themselves are multi-oscillatory processes. They mediate between body and perceived as well as anticipated environment at any moment.
Wolfgang Jantzen. Alexander r. luria and the theory of functional systems. In Dietmar Dietrich, Georg Fodor, Gerhard Zucker, and Dietmar Bruckner, editors, Simulating the Mind – A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, pages 381 – 394. Springer, Wien, 1 edition, 2009.@incollection{Jan09, title = “Alexander R. Luria and the Theory of Functional Systems”, author = “Wolfgang Jantzen”, pages = “381 — 394″, booktitle = “Simulating the {M}ind – {A} {T}echnical {N}europsychoanalytical {A}pproach”, editor = “Dietmar Dietrich and Georg Fodor and Gerhard Zucker and Dietmar Bruckner”, publisher = “Springer, Wien”, year = “2009″, edition = 1}
A Mind for Resolving the Interior-Exterior Distinctions
Ariane BazanAbstract
During the ENF conference day on July 23rd 2007, both Peter Palensky and Gerhard Zucker (né Pratl) presented schematic simulation modules of the mind in which one detail struck me. While the brain was conceived as embedded in a body and likewise, this body was conceived as present in a context or an environment, the mind-module was built so as to make, at the level of the perception entry point, an a priori distinction between external and internal signals, i.e. between signals coming from the environment or from the body respectively. In Pratl’s model (flashed for only one second), these entry points were even anatomically distinct.Ariane Bazan. A mind for resolving the interior-exterior distinctions. In Dietmar Dietrich, Georg Fodor, Gerhard Zucker, and Dietmar Bruckner, editors, Simulating the Mind – A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, pages 394 – 399. Springer, Wien, 1 edition, 2009.@incollection{Baz09, title = “A Mind for Resolving the Interior-Exterior Distinctions”, author = “Ariane Bazan”, pages = “394 — 399″, booktitle = “Simulating the {M}ind – {A} {T}echnical {N}europsychoanalytical {A}pproach”, editor = “Dietmar Dietrich and Georg Fodor and Gerhard Zucker and Dietmar Bruckner”, publisher = “Springer, Wien”, year = “2009″, edition = 1}
The Vision, Revisited
The Mental Apparatus for Complex Automation Systems – A Combined Computer Scientific and Neuropsychoanalytical Approach
Dietmar Dietrich, Mihaela Ulieru, Dietmar Bruckner, Georg FodorAbstract
The INDIN/ENF [16] heralded the start of a paradigm shift in the design of intelligent systems. As the emerging community of interest further investigates ways to move forward on this path, we herewith underline how, if several boundary conditions are met, the hypotheses and suggestions which were postulated at the first meeting, can be backed by scientific and technological advances tested in concrete applications and projects.Dietmar Dietrich, Mihaela Ulieru, Dietmar Bruckner, and Georg Fodor. The vision, revisited. the mental apparatus for complex automation systems – a combined computer scientific and neuropsychoanalytical approach. In Dietmar Dietrich, Georg Fodor, Gerhard Zucker, and Dietmar Bruckner, editors, Simulating the Mind – A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, pages 399 – 415. Springer, Wien, 1 edition, 2009.@incollection{DUBF09, title = “The Vision, Revisited. The Mental Apparatus for Complex Automation Systems – A Combined Computer Scientific and Neuropsychoanalytical Approach”, author = “Dietmar Dietrich and Mihaela Ulieru and Dietmar Bruckner and Georg Fodor”, pages = “399 — 415″, booktitle = “Simulating the {M}ind – {A} {T}echnical {N}europsychoanalytical {A}pproach”, editor = “Dietmar Dietrich and Georg Fodor and Gerhard Zucker and Dietmar Bruckner”, publisher = “Springer, Wien”, year = “2009″, edition = 1}
List of Authors in Alphabetic Order
- Ariane Bazan Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
- Andrzej Buller Cama-Soft A.I. Lab, Gdynia, Poland
- Dietmar Bruckner Vienna University of Technology, Austria
- Tobias Deutsch Vienna University of Technology, Austria
- Dietmar Dietrich Vienna University of Technology, Austria
- Joseph Dodds Institute of the Czech Psychoanalytical Society, Czech Republic; Charles University; University of New York in Prague, Czech Republic
- Georg Fodor Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Austria; University of Cape Town, South Africa
- Robert Galatzer-Levy Institute for Psychoanalysis, Chicago Illinois, United States; University of Chicago, United States
- Wolfgang Jantzen Universität Bremen, Germany
- Roland Lang Vienna University of Technology, Austria
- Brit Müller Vienna Circle of Psychoanalysis, Austria; Vienna University of Technology, Austria
- Charlotte Rösener ACS Technologies, Austria
- Matthias J. Schlemmer Vienna University of Technology, Austria
- Ron Spielman Australian Psychoanalytical Society, Australia
- Anna Tmej Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Austria; Vienna University of Technology, Austria
- Mika Turkia University of Helsinki, Finland
- Mihaela Ulieru Canada Research Chair; The University Of New Brunswick, Canada
- Markus Vincze Vienna University of Technology, Austria
- Takahiro Yakoh Keio University, Japan
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